

Recommended Read: *Robots Will Steal Your Job, But That's OK: A Review Fourteen Years On*

First self-published in 2012 and later translated into six languages, Federico Pistono's book asks what happens when technological progress reduces the need for paid work. Fourteen years later, its diagnosis of disruption looks more convincing than its timetable, economics or policy prescriptions.

Its argument rests on four claims:

- Technology is improving exponentially.
- Automation can create structural unemployment without artificial general intelligence.
- Purpose and "flow", rather than employment itself, are the foundations of happiness.
- Creating enough replacement jobs may be less valuable than redesigning how society distributes income and time.


The result is idealistic but readable. By treating automation not simply as a threat but as an opportunity to reconsider the purpose of work and the distribution of economic gains, Pistono establishes the questions against which the book can now be judged.

What the Book Got Right—and Wrong

Fourteen years on, Pistono's central idea has aged better than his timetable. He expected robots and algorithms to displace routine work; instead, generative AI and AI agents have moved first into cognitive, white-collar tasks. Anthropic's Economic Index estimates that AI could theoretically perform 94% of tasks in computer and finance jobs, although only about 36% are currently automated. The gap between technical capability and actual adoption is crucial: exposure does not translate immediately into job loss.

Nor has Pistono's forecast of "economic collapse" materialised. Stanford payroll research finds no widespread AI-related job losses, but it does show pressure at the entry level: employment among 22- to 25-year-olds in highly exposed occupations is 19% below the expected level, compared with 15% a year earlier. The effect comes mainly through reduced hiring, not mass dismissals. This suggests that AI is narrowing the path into professional work before eliminating established roles.

That entry-level pressure sits alongside more encouraging company-level evidence. PwC's 2026 Barometer



reports that productivity growth is 40% higher at businesses most exposed to AI and that their headcount is growing faster. Yet the same study finds a shorter career ladder, with junior roles increasingly demanding senior-level judgement. Morgan Stanley therefore describes the disruption so far as "modest": the immediate outcome is not wholesale unemployment, but a gradual reallocation of opportunity and bargaining power.

Pistono's policy proposals have moved closer to mainstream debate, although not to consensus. Elon Musk has advocated a government-funded "universal high income", while the International Labour Organization argues that universal basic income is the wrong response

to AI-driven displacement. The disagreement reinforces a weakness in the book: it is more persuasive about the social problem than about the policy solution.

Its economics also understates how technological change creates new demand and new forms of work. More importantly for investors, Pistono gives too little attention to ownership. The gains from automation are accumulating with the owners of computing power, models and distribution, while labour adjusts more slowly through weaker graduate hiring and higher skill requirements. The book was therefore directionally right about disruption, but too certain about its speed and too vague about how the benefits would be distributed.

Five Chapters Worth Reading Today

The following five chapters provide the clearest route through Pistono's argument. Read together, they show why his diagnosis of technological disruption remains useful even where his timetable, economics and policy prescriptions are less convincing.

Chapter 2: The Luddite Fallacy

Key message: Pistono questions the historical assurance that technology ultimately creates more jobs than it destroys. That pattern may fail if automation outpaces workers' ability to move into new roles. Henry Ford's insight adds the demand problem: workers must still afford what the economy produces.

Why it matters now: AI may resemble earlier innovation cycles, but the speed of adjustment could matter more than the long-run outcome.

Chapter 6: Artificial Intelligence

Key message: Pistono's most prescient claim is that software will take jobs before physical robots: "it is harder to automate a housemaid than it is to replace a radiologist."

Why it matters now: Generative AI has reached cognitive, white-collar tasks before robotics has transformed most manual work.

Chapter 9: Unemployment Tomorrow

Key message: Across large occupations, Pistono argues that successive waves of job creation demand more skill from fewer people, turning retraining into "a game you cannot win."

Why it matters now: The chapter supplies the conceptual link between today's weaker entry-level hiring and the longer-term risk that access to professional work becomes progressively narrower.

Chapter 10: Work Identity

Key message: Tying identity to a job title makes unemployment feel like a loss of self; purpose must therefore be broader than paid work.

Why it matters now: Shorter career ladders make an identity beyond conventional progression increasingly valuable.

Chapter 18: Practical Advice for Everyone

Key message: Because conventional advice to network and compete cannot work for everyone, Pistono advocates continuous learning, teaching others and greater self-sufficiency.

Why it matters now: Learning to work alongside AI is the most practical recommendation, but the chapter's lasting contribution is broader: resilience may require people to build purpose and capability beyond employment. That insight captures the book at its best: its diagnosis of technological disruption remains persuasive, even if its timetable, economics and policy prescriptions are less convincing. Its enduring value lies in challenging readers to rethink the relationship between work, identity and technological progress.

Pistono's book remains worth reading not because its most dramatic predictions have come true, but because its central question has become harder to ignore. AI has not yet produced mass unemployment; instead, it is reshaping hiring, compressing career ladders and shifting economic power towards the owners of technology. That makes the book's challenge—to separate income, identity and purpose from conventional employment—more relevant than its forecasts. Fourteen years on, its strongest contribution is therefore not a blueprint for a post-work society, but a warning that societies, companies and individuals must decide how the gains from automation are shared before disruption makes that choice for them.

